AMBASSADOR'S REMARKS AND PUBLIC EVENTS

Remarks by Ambassador Ross Wilson

EURASIA STRATEGIC RESEARCH CENTER (ASAM)
ANKARA, JANUARY 25, 2007

Interlocutor:  General Edip Baser

QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, my question will be short.  You have said that the Iraqi Government should make a decision by herself.  No one, including the United States, no other country should be involved in the decisions of the Iraqi Government.  (inaudible)  Do you really believe that the Iraqi Government is at this time in a position of strength and authority, good enough to make sound decisions for the future of Iraq?  Thank you.

AMBASSADOR WILSON:  What I tried to convey in my prepared remarks was not exactly the sense that you repeated back.  Instead, it was the sense that no one should dictate to the Iraqi leaders and the Iraqi people “you will do this.”  We think that’s wrong.  And it’s not consistent with the restoration in our relations.  It is not consistent with the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty that took place a year or two ago – couple of years ago.  It is not consistent with what we expect of the Iraqis.  Of course, as I tried to indicate, Iraq’s friends and its neighbors have a right and in fact an obligation to give advice.  I don’t call that interference in anybody’s internal affairs.  To come to your question, do they have the strength and the authority, if I can paraphrase, to make wise decisions and, you could add, follow through on them.  Ultimately it is probably hard to know what the answer to that question is.  Twelve million Iraqis went to the polls in December of 2005.  It was not a limited election.  The participation was broad throughout Iraqi society.  They elected their leadership for better or for worse.  In giving them advice, we need to try to guide them in the right direction whether it is Kirkuk, whether it is the problem of the PKK in northern Iraq, whether it is the problem of other terrorist groups and insurgent groups in that country, both foreign and domestic, that are undermining prospects for its future.  And we need to give them that advice.

Interlocutor:  I have put down six names, four on this side, two on this side.  Ambassador Aksoy, please.

QUESTION:  Thank you very much.  I am Oktay Aksoy, Foreign Policy Institute.  I was going to ask on the same line as General Baser asked, and comment on your pointing out that we should not dictate the Iraqi Government.  Yes, I agree that one should not dictate the Iraqi Government, but the real problem in Kirkuk, I think, is the Constitution, which I believe was kind of a dictation on the Iraqi authorities.  So, wouldn’t it be possible for the US to facilitate this source of contention to be removed and to have a better possibility for the future of Iraq?

AMBASSADOR WILSON:  Thank you for that question.  The Transitional Administrative Law that governed in Iraq for the initial period after American coalition forces entered was more largely the product of American writing, direction and coalition writing and direction.  The constitution that was adopted last year, 2005, was not the product of American dictation.  We gave them advice.  We did not tell them “do this.”  We did not say “don’t do that.”  And I just want to correct the record on that.  I think what, maybe to rephrase in a different way the point that I made earlier, the way that countries interact when they disagree about something is they try to persuade the other country why it is in their interests to do A or B or C.  And frankly, that applies whether the subject is international or foreign policy issue or a domestic one that might be discussed privately.  I think this is one of those.  I believe Turkey has a legitimate point about Kirkuk, and the sensitivity of Kirkuk.  As I said, lots of Iraqis have the same concern, are raising the same Kirkuk.  Those issues need to be discussed.  Turkey has a right to express its view and has and will continue to do so.  And I certainly hope that the thrust of Turkey’s efforts would be to try to persuade the leaders in Iraq why it is in their interests to take a different course.  We have discussed a number of these issues with the Iraqis.  Turkey, certainly, can do so as well, and has done so as well. 

Interlocutor: (inaudible) on this side and then I’ll go to the other side and come back.

QUESTION:  My question is what the United States can do for the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations.  As you would recall, Prime Minister Erdogan suggested nearly two years ago that a joint commission of the Turkish and Armenian historians be established to study the events of the 1915.  Not only the archives of Turkey and Armenia, but also those of the relevant third countries, and share their findings with the public.  Turkey is still expecting their positive reply from Armenia for this proposal.  I believe if American administration can encourage the Armenian side to positively respond to this proposal, it will contribute to the efforts for further (inaudible) in Turkish-American relations.  Apart from this proposal, the US Administration can also encourage both countries for the establishments of other joint commissions which will work under the inter-governmental committee, and will address all aspects of Turkish-Armenian bilateral relations.  I believe the establishment of such (inaudible) opportunity for the creation of mutual confidence needed for the normalization of bilateral relations with our neighbors.  I would like to hear your views on this.

AMBASSADOR WILSON:  Thank you for your question.  The short answer is I agree.  The United States strongly supported the Prime Minister’s initiative of a couple of years ago.  We have discussed it here and also through our embassy in Yerevan, encouraging both governments to try to come together on an agreement to set up a commission or commissions that would deal in a direct way on both issues of history and all the other issues that would be bound up in the process of normalizing relations.  I had a brief discussion with one of the representatives from Armenia that came for Mr. Dink’s funeral about this.  I think there have been some contacts, I wouldn’t want to predict what may be or a timeline or even the prospects for moving ahead on this.  But it is exactly the kind of thing that we want to see and that we believe is the right way forward to reconciliation and peaceful relations between two countries and two peoples certainly that have a very long history of living together. 

QUESTION:  I have two questions, if I may.  The first question relates to Iran.  If (inaudible) or weapons (inaudible) declared or non-declared.  Do you think there will be a need for additional security arrangements between Turkey and the United States (inaudible) additional security arrangements if and when Iran acquires nuclear weapons capability or (inaudible)?  My second question relates to Iraq and the Kurds.  Actually, alliances are formed against a common threat, and so long as the threat exists alliances to exist and remain.  And once the threat abolishes, alliances normally lose their significance.  This is how it happened between Turkey and (inaudible) countries with respect to the (inaudible) Soviet threat.  And once the Soviet regime divides and Turkish (inaudible) NATO alliance diminished, I won’t say abolished, but changed.  Now, the perceived preference of the United States, of Kurds, of Turkey (inaudible) explained by intellectuals and academics as that there was an alliance between the United States and the Kurds against the Saddam regime.  So, Saddam has gone and (inaudible).  Now, the perceived preference of the US towards Kurds, of Turkey, still remains.  Can you explain to us how an alliance is still keeping its significance (inaudible) Turkish-American relations as far as I can see.

AMBASSADOR WILSON:  You mean with respect to our – your term – our alliance with the Kurds or the alliance with Turkey? 

QUESTION:  The alliance between the United States and the Kurds is still remaining even after Saddam has gone.

AMBASSADOR WILSON:  Ok.  On the first question.  One of the lessons I have learned in almost twenty-eight years as a diplomat is to be very careful about speculative questions “if this happens, then what?”  And so I won’t give you a very direct answer to your question.  But suffice it to say that the matter -  first we are allies.  We are treaty allies.  We are bound to defend one another in the event of threats to our national security under the terms of the North Atlantic Charter and the way that those provisions get involved – first.  Second, there are clearly serious implications for the alliance and for the United States and Turkey, given that we are the largest country in the alliance, and Turkey borders on Iran.  There are serious defense and security and political implications that follow if Iran ultimately acquires nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them.  That’s a conversation that our governments need to have both bilaterally in the NATO.  I don’t want to speculate further about what may come out of it.  It’s clearly a very serious issue for us and I think it’s a serious issue for Turkey. 

On your second question, I will start out the same way.  The United States and Turkey are allies.  We have been allies for 60 years.  I expect we will continue to be allies.  We are bound by a treaty commitment that is certainly not unique in the world, but is confined to a certain set of countries; NATO, our treaty allies in the Far East, there are a couple of others.  Clearly, we looked for and received support for our efforts to - coalition efforts - to remove Saddam Hussein from Iraq; support of the Kurds, and we got that support.  We are friends of the Kurds.  I don’t think there is any necessity for us to make a choice between our friends the Kurds in northern Iraq and our friends and allies, Turkey.  They are not mutually incompatible.  Those two relationships are not mutually incompatible.  Quite the contrary, I would maintain that the Kurds of northern Iraq need a good relationship with this country, a point that we have been making to them.  Turkey needs to have a good relationship with all of Iraq, including the north no less than any other part.  That should be the goal, and certainly is one of the goals of our diplomacy, whether it is in terms of Turkish-Iraqi relations generally or the PKK. 

QUESTION:  (by ex-Minister Vehbi Dincerler) In his speech a couple of days ago, President Bush said something very clearly.  He said ‘we have a new strategy in Iraq.’  According to my understanding, the most critical part of that strategy is the fact that the Iraqi Government will have to handle its own affairs from now on.  In fact they can’t defend Baghdad themselves and the 20,000 new troops that we will send will be placed in their army and defend Baghdad, he said.  That demonstrates that the Iraqi Government is weak at the moment.  However there are many expectations from the Iraq Government – let them handle their own affairs, let them distribute the oil themselves, let them keep the security in all the other provinces themselves.  These are also phrases from President Bush’s speech.  Now, how and when can such a weak government ensure the territorial integrity of the country?  And how can it ensure the border security?  Again in his speech, President Bush said that the sectarian and ethnical clashes are going towards a chaotic state, and there may be dire consequences of this.  But he didn’t mention that there is a serious threat that Iraq may end up divided.  In my opinion, the most important issue is this.  What should be done to prevent Iraq from being divided?  If it gets divided, I believe that the US troops will have to stay in the region for an incredibly longer time.  It is true that Mr. Ambassador referred to the territorial integrity as their approach, which we are of course pleased to hear, but in general, we couldn’t sense a concern for disintegration.  Thank you.

AMBASSADOR WILSON:  You have raised many issues, and I am trying to organize my thoughts.  President Bush’s speech on Iraq of ten or twelve days ago, I think, reflected his and the American people’s deep concern about the direction that Iraq is going.  And that’s a concern that a lot of people have, including here, if not even more so than we do.  He consulted widely about what kind of course corrections might be made; The Iraq Study Group, other members of Congress, our foreign partners and friends, including Turkey.  And I would put his conversation with the Prime Minister in October, or the part that dealt with Iraq in that category.  The new strategy has many elements.  One is the additional 21,000 troops that are to be deployed in Baghdad, mostly in Baghdad, and to some extent, in Anbar province.  If I understood you correctly, there may be a misunderstanding that these troops would be under Iraqi command.  They will not be under Iraqi command.  They will be embedded, yes, embedded with significantly increased Iraqi forces that are - the aim of which, the aim of the overall increase is to create a window of space and of time for the Iraqi Government to make some hard decisions that have not been made over the course of the last eight or nine months of that government’s existence. 

In that connection, the intention is to encourage the Iraqis to get made their decisions on some of the issues that have been divisive – the oil, law, and what happens to the revenues.  Are they for everybody?  Or are they for some?  With the government leaders clearly pledging that the revenues are for everyone, but they need to work out the legislation to describe that.  The arrangements on de-Baathification that have also been divisive, also a topic of debate, also not resolved.  He talked about, Iraqi leaders have talked about moving to provincial elections that can more effectively take in or draw into the system people that feel like they are left out, and groups that feel like they are left out.  I would note also he talked about the constitution.  I have forgotten his exact words, but something like a fair and proper procedure for looking at changes in the constitution.  President Bush did not describe what those ought to be.  And those changes will be up to the Iraqi people, of course, but that was an important element as well. 

And his speech also talked about economic efforts to try to speed the delivery of aid and of services to the people of Iraq that they’ll feel a little bit more allegiance to the government.  They’ll feel they are getting something from the government.  All of those elements and others that are in the speech that I didn’t refer to are aimed at trying to help Iraq as a unified entity, a unified country, to succeed.  A blind man can see that sectarian violence is tearing the country apart.  I don’t think he needed to say that.  I don’t think he needed to make that observation.  He clearly referred, and it is our clear policy that we want to do everything we can to ensure the unity and the territorial integrity of that country. 

As for things like being able to carry out actions like protecting the borders or ensuring Iraq’s territorial integrity, sure, there is a problem.  There is a big problem.  Turkey has its own PKK issues with terrorists who are live in encampments mostly along, right along the border that are not effectively controlled and cannot be effectively controlled by security forces directed from Baghdad.  Iraq also faces a serious problem with insurgents and fighters that come across the Syrian border and other borders as well as from Iran.  Securing any country’s border is a complicated thing.  We have our issues.  The trust of our efforts there is to try to help the Iraqis to make progress towards those things.  At least for now, I think that’s about the best we can hope for.

Interlocutor:  We have time for one last question and that will be from Ambassador (inaudible)

QUESTION:  Let me first come back to this very important issue of Kirkuk.  My first question relates to that.  In your previous statement, and I took notes, you said that we are now listening Turkey’s views or opinions.  This is very rewarding.  It is very important.  And your government, your side, your administration should carefully listen to Turkey’s views on this issue, this important issue.  And it is a very sensitive issue (inaudible) as you have indicated.  My question is the following.  You referred to the provisions of the existing constitution.  The constitution provides that by the end of 2007 holding a referendum on Kirkuk.  But the same constitution also provides that if and when peace and stability is re-established in Iraq throughout Iraq.  Do you believe that by the end of 2007 peace and stability or tranquility will be re-established throughout Iraq so as to permit holding a referendum?  This is my first question.  The second question is about Armenian resolution.  This is indeed a very important issue as well relating to Turkey’s American the relations which we wanted to improve to the extent possible by both sides.  I hope that this resolution will be defeated.  And you said that the Administration will not change its policy, as I took note of it.  It is indeed important to hear and to see concretely the Administration’s (inaudible) views or policy.  Do you think that the Administration will actively be involved with the Congress with a view to expressing this policy’s effect and work with our side or with other sides against the resolution which will be set on the table before the House of Representatives?  Thank you very much.

AMBASSADOR WILSON:  Thank you, Ambassador Kandemir.  On your first question, will the peace and internal stability conditions in Iraq permit a referendum by the end of 2007 on Kirkuk, I don’t know.  How the Iraqis will resolve these two issues in their constitution, I don’t know.  On your second question, will the Administration be actively involved with the Congress in trying, in working to discourage and defeat or deflect a Armenian resolution?  Yes, it will.  And I expect that you’ll, in due time - there is a season and a timing for these things in the United States.  But I expect that you will in due course see a strong effort by the Administration against any resolution that’s submitted.  I don’t believe a resolution has been submitted at this point.  I expect that it will in the fullness of time.