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  Remarks Bio Former Chiefs of Mission Eric S. Edelman

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Ambassador Eric S. Edelman Roundtable with Journalists

At the Residence, Ankara, Turkey, December 10, 2003

Ambassador Eric Edelman: I think I would start my observations first by repeating something I've said privately to many people here in Turkey and in Istanbul when I went there two weeks ago. I want to convey, in a personal sense, my condolences, along with those that have been extended by President Bush directly to the Prime Minister and by various other senior official American visitors lately to the Turkish people, for the loss of life and the large number of people who were injured in the two attacks last month in Istanbul. Two weeks ago Monday, I went to Istanbul very shortly after the bombings at the HSBC bank and at the British Consulate. I had an opportunity to visit with some of the victims of the attacks on the bank and on the consulate. I was also able to visit with the Mayor and the Governor. I was able to visit all four of the bomb sites, and to call on our British colleagues, who we were housing in our old consulate building in the Palazzo Corpi in Beyoglu. I was able to attend a memorial service at the Jewish hospital for two of the victims who were killed in the synagogue bombings on November 15. It was a very emotional and difficult day. It was hard not to be moved by what I saw. Particularly at the HSBC bank and the British consulate site, it was hard not to be struck by the scale and the scope of the destruction. 

When I saw Vice President Cheney last week in Washington, I mentioned to him that athough the scale, of course, was quite different, the impact of going to the site of the bombings was very similar to the emotional impact of going to Ground Zero with him two years ago, six weeks after the attack on September 11. It was also very hard not to be impressed by the determination of the authorities in Istanbul to clean up the sites, to recover from the destruction, and to try to get back to normal life as quickly as possible given the circumstances. In addition to conveying my condolences when I was there, I tried to also convey the message that, as President Bush has said, we want and hope to be able to assist the Government of Turkey as best we can in its own work to find out who is responsible for this and to be able to allow the Government of Turkey to bring the people who did it to justice. 

Let me just make a couple of observations about the broader relationship, and then I really would be delighted to have the discussion that I indicated I hope we can have. It's no secret that the U.S.-Turkish relationship has passed through a difficult year. I think we've just been through two months, however, that have been very intense in terms of the pace of the discussions and the consultations that we have had between our two countries. I think it is fair to say that we are now creating a context for a steady improvement in the U.S.-Turkish relationship and in the strategic relationship that we have. I have been in Washington twice in the last month. I can tell you from my discussions with people there that there is enormous gratitude for the various decisions of the National Security Council, the Council of Ministers, and then the Parliament to offer the possibility of Turkish troops joining coalition forces in Iraq. There is appreciation as well, based on a lot of intensive consultations, with the statesmanlike manner in which the Government of Turkey conducted itself as we discussed the possibility for a number of weeks, and the Government ultimately decided to suspend its offer for the time being. 

There are a number of institutional fora that have not met for some time which we've been able to reactivate. Three weeks ago, my colleague at the Department of Defense, Miro Ricardo, hosted General Basbug for the High Level Defense Group meeting in Williamsburg. His visit was followed by a visit of the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Pace, and on the weekend by the Deputy Commander of the European Command, General Chuck Wald. And of course yesterday we had my distinguished predecessor and friend and colleague, Marc Grossman, here with an interagency delegation to begin a process of consultations throughout Europe on what we call our global footprint, which is to say the way our forces are disposed throughout Europe, including here in Turkey. 

On the economic side, we also had a meeting last week in Washington of the Economic Partnership Council chaired by Undersecretary of State Al Larson on the U.S. side and Undersecretary Ugur Ziyal on the Turkish side along with the participation of representatives of the private sector of both countries. I have had, as an aspiration, trying to move us in the direction of a U.S.-Turkish economic relationship that is on the same level as the strategic relationship that we have enjoyed for over fifty years. It seems to me our relationship is important enough that it merits that. It was the subject of my first speech here in Turkey. I think it was the general consensus of the participants in the EPC that that should be our aspiration, that we have a lot of work to do to get there, but that we have already begun to engage in some of that work. We have an opportunity, I think, with developments in Iraq, to help move our economic relationship in that direction. I noted today that, for instance, Koc Holding was saying that by the end of the year it will have exported almost a quarter of a billion dollars to Iraq. There have been lots of other economic exchange in terms of resuming the trade relationship between Turkey and Iraq, and that's a good thing. 

We also have the Iraq reconstruction initiative that has been announced in the last few days by Secretary of Commerce Evans. Turkey will undoubtedly have a part in this. I have every expectation that Turkey will do very well, just as Turkey has done extremely well in terms of the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Secretary Wolfowitz has issued a finding about countries eligible to participate in the awarding of contracts for Iraqi reconstruction. Turkey is included in that list of countries. I know there is a great hunger for information on this among the Turkish community. I had a meeting earlier today with the Chamber of Industry across the street from the embassy, where I talked with board members about this. Much of that information now is available on the CPA website, and also on a special website which is linked to the CPA website that has been established by the Iraq Reconstruction Program Management Office that is going to oversee the disbursal of the 18 billion dollars plus that the Congress appropriated for reconstruction in Iraq. 
Finally, I would say there is good reason to believe that some of the work we have done in the last few weeks will continue to build on itself when the Prime Minister goes to Washington at the end of January to meet with President Bush. That, in a sense, is a way station toward the NATO summit in Istanbul at the end of June, which we believe is a terrific opportunity for Turkey but also for the U.S.-Turkish bilateral relationship. This is a very complex relationship with a lot of other elements to it. I thought I would just start with that snapshot of where I see the relationship. But I am sure there are all sorts of other elements of the relationship that many of you will want to explore. I hope we can have a good conversation about that.

QUESTION: You mentioned the normalization of bilateral relations. Just to reconfirm one point, was the Turkish decision to send troops to Iraq a key factor in normalizing the relationship?

Ambassador Edelman: I think the relationship was already en route towards normalization. Whenever you have a bump in the road like we had last spring, it takes a bit of time to recover. Secretary Powell came here in April. We put money in the supplemental legislation for Turkey in the spring. Undersecretary Ziyal came to Washington in June and had very good meetings. I participated in Washington in Foreign Minister Gul's visit when he came at the end of July after I had been sworn in, but before I actually came here to Ankara. So I would say we already had an effort that was building to restore the relationship to a more normal track, more in tune with what it had been before. But there is no question that the decision on October 7 by the Parliament was something that got a lot of attention in Washington -- a lot of favorable attention. It went a very long way to help erase some of the feelings, I think, that might have existed before on both sides. 

QUESTION: Do you agree with the conclusion that Turkey is going to be occupied with the Afghanistan issue more than ever before? There is that impression recently. Also, what role does the U.S. expect Turkey to play in the relationship with Iraq?

Ambassador Edelman: On Afghanistan, first of all, Turkey already has played an enormous role in Afghanistan, because it took over the leadership of the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) from the UK -- if I recall correctly, I think it was in June of 2002 -- and held it for another six or seven months until the Germans could take command of it. They did an outstanding job. I have talked with General Abizaid about that. He had enormously positive things to say about the skill and the professionalism of the Turkish peacekeepers who were involved in that effort. There are still, I think, some 200 Turkish peacekeepers involved in the ISAF effort now that it is under NATO command. We have begun now a discussion in NATO and with our allies about the possibilities of moving beyond Kabul, first with regard to what we call provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). These are small teams of military and civilian folks who are working with the local officials in different parts of Afghanistan to facilitate reconstruction efforts, coordinating security and reconstruction and civil affairs. The Germans, for instance, are taking over the leadership of a PRT in Kanduz. We are talking with others about the possibility of other PRTs in other parts of Afghanistan. The notion is that, over time, these provincial reconstruction teams can become the core, or the seed if you will, of a broader ISAF presence outside of Kabul to help stabilize the situation and permit more rapid reconstruction. We are only in the opening phases of that discussion. I think, given Turkey's past experience in Afghanistan, and given the outstanding role they played in peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo, it is natural to hope that Turkey will play a role. Exactly how large a role or what that role will be remains to be seen. But Turkey has a valuable contribution to make in Afghanistan, as it already has. Turkey has also, of course, as I mentioned earlier, played an enormous role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, with over 300 million dollars worth of reconstruction contracts. 

On Iraq, I spoke earlier about the resumption of a more normal trade relationship than has been possible over the last decade because of the sanctions regime and the restrictions which that imposed and the cost it imposed on Turkey. I think there are lots of positive opportunities for Turkey in its economic relations with Iraq. I also hope that there will be some training opportunities, because there are a number of people on the Iraqi side who are going to need to be trained in a variety of areas -- the police, military training of various sorts, borders, customs. There is a lot to be done. 

We had a very successful visit while I was gone in the United States about ten days ago of a delegation headed by my friend and colleague Dick Jones -- our former Ambassador in Kazakhstan, Lebanon and, most recently, Kuwait, and who is now Ambassador Bremer's deputy at CPA in Baghdad. He came with a delegation that included a number of members of the Iraqi Council of Ministers, the Interior Minister and others. They had a meeting with colleagues on the Turkish side to look at a variety of issues connected with increasing economic opportunities - the question of border gates and increasing their capacity, and making sure that the large amount of goods that are sometimes stacked up at Habur can get through to Iraq in a timely fashion. They looked at a lot of other issues that have been of concern, including the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline. I think that was a major step forward. We are hoping that it will be an ongoing dialogue between our colleagues at CPA in Baghdad and their Turkish colleagues there. There will undoubtedly be a very large Turkish role in Iraq. It just stands to reason. They are neighbors, and there is every reason that we have a vibrant commerce. 

What we want to see at the end of this process is a very strong relationship between a democratic Turkey and what we hope will be a democratic Iraq. They will be two of the only democracies -- if we are successful in Iraq as I hope we will be -- in this immediate region. There is another one with which Turkey has a strong relationship as well -- Israel. But we hope that the Iraq relationship will become a very strong one, and that it will radiate outwards, that its influence will be felt elsewhere. I think it gets to something I am very fond of saying here and I've said this a lot: in the Cold War, our relationship with Turkey was about containment. First, the containment of Soviet power and Turkey's role as part of the northern tier, blocking Soviet expansion into a strategically vital area in the Middle East. Then, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, we spent a decade containing the regime of Saddam Hussein. Now that we have moved into a post-Cold War, post-Saddam era in our relationship, I don't think it's so much about containment anymore. We still have, because of Turkey's location, many common strategic interests, as events in Georgia over the last few weeks have demonstrated once again. But in a very basic sense, one of our most fundamental interests in Turkey now is that Turkey succeeds in the path that it has set itself on towards ultimate membership in the EU. It is important, obviously, for Turkey to succeed in this effort. But we believe that it is important not just for Turkey, but also for Europe and for the United States. This is why we continue to strongly support Turkey's EU vocation and its ultimate membership in the European Union. I think this is not unrelated to Iraq. If Turkey can make this successful transition, if it can complete the trajectory that it has been on for eighty years to root itself in the economic and social institutions of Europe -- firmly and finally -- as it has been in the security institutions for the last fifty years, I think it will be an incredibly powerful example that after much sacrifice, after much work, there is no reason why a country that is ninety-eight percent Muslim cannot successfully combine democracy and modernity in a market economy. I think that Turkey's success will have a big impact on Iraq. 

QUESTION: The Grossman visit highlighted Incirlik airbase and, in general, the global war against terrorism. What will be Turkey's role? Will Turkey serve as a center in the global war against terrorism? And what about the situation at Incirlik airbase? Generally speaking, what is the expectation from Turkey in the fight against terrorism?

Ambassador Edelman: First, with regard to Undersecretary Grossman's visit, as I said, he was here as part of a series of consultations we are undertaking about our global force posture. By and large, the force posture we find ourselves in is very much a remnant of the Cold War. That was a period of time when we were worried about a Soviet invasion of central Europe. We were worried about the flanks, both the northern and the southern flank. We had very heavy forces in Europe to try to prevent that threat from eventuating. We are trying to rearrange our forces in a way that takes into account, first of all, the places we are more likely to need to be using them. If you look at where we have used our forces over the last decade, we have used them in a variety of contingencies, but never in central Europe. So we need to look at getting new capabilities out into the field and getting them closer to where they are likely to be operating. We have greatly valued our arrangement at Incirlik, and the joint operations that we have conducted there and from there. We hope to be able to continue to do that. I don't particularly see any big change in the future and, in any event, Undersecretary Grossman's visit was the beginning of a series of consultations. Whatever the future will hold in that regard will be determined over a period of time as we consult with our colleagues in Turkey and elsewhere as we realign our forces. 

QUESTION: Would you agree with the conclusion that in the foreseeable future U.S. forces will withdraw from Europe and leave it to a European army?

Ambassador Edelman: No. No, I don't see that at all. I think that we will continue to be operating in Europe. We will continue to have forces in Europe. We will continue to be committed to our transatlantic ties in Europe. What will change is perhaps the disposition of forces, the kinds of forces, the missions that they have, but I don't see any diminution in the U.S. commitment to Europe. On the contrary, I see this as a way of strengthening the U.S. commitment to Europe because we are trying to bring into alignment the kinds of forces we will need to meet the actual threats that we face collectively, including in the global war on terror.

QUESTION: Turkey has openly said it does not want PKK remaining in the mountains in northern Iraq. The United States is effectively controlling the area. First, is the United States willing to bring down the PKK elements in the mountains by force? Second, do you have the means to do that? 

QUESTION: As a follow-up to this question, lower-level American officers reportedly have been having meetings with the PKK. This is a major concern and worry in Turkey. Can you comment on this? 

Ambassador Edelman: Let me try to answer the first part of the question, then I'll come back to the second part. First, I think it is important to step back and look at the record of the U.S on the issue of the PKK. Some people might argue with me, but I think it is fair to say that Turkey has not had too many better friends in the world on the question of PKK-KADEK than the United States. The PKK has been on our foreign terrorists organization list for many years and, within a matter of months after KADEK was created as a successor organization, we put it on our list as well. When other countries were withholding military equipment from Turkey during the time of the insurgency, we did not do that. We worked very closely with Turkey and were able to assist in the rendition of Abdullah Ocalan. Most recently, when KADEK announced that it was going to create yet a new identity for itself -- a new name -- we immediately issued a statement saying that no matter what they call themselves, they remain, in our view, a terrorist organization and their leaders in northern Iraq are subject to arrest. President Bush has made a pretty clear commitment that, at the end of the day, Iraq should no longer be a platform for terrorism of any kind, certainly not directed at any of its neighbors. That includes the PKK-KADEK. This has been a subject of intense discussion in a number of our encounters with our Turkish colleagues over the last couple of weeks. I think there are lot of different ways to get at this problem. Military operations are one of them. I don't anticipate, personally, military operations in the near term. I don't want to get into the details of exactly how and what we might do, because I just think it would not be useful to telegraph to others what we are doing. But we have a clear commitment that everybody understands, that at the end of day Iraq cannot be a haven for the PKK-KADEK. It is no secret that our forces have lots of tasks to accomplish in Iraq, and one has to always have priorities. This is a problem that we have every intention of getting to. 

To answer the second question: when I worked for then-Secretary of Defense Cheney back in the first Bush Administration, he was interviewed one time and asked whether or not something had happened in the Pentagon. This was when he was serving as Defense Secretary. He said "look, there are 22,000 people who work in this institution, and at any given time I am sure that some of them are doing something stupid. But the main point is, what is the policy?" And our policy on this issue is clear. We do not negotiate with terrorists. Period.

QUESTION: You mentioned that the fight against the PKK is a matter of priority for American forces. But there is a request from Turkey to conduct a joint operation. How do you see the possibility of Turkey contributing to that?

Ambassador Edelman: I said I did not want to get into the details of what we might or might not do. But we have been working together on different ways that we might address this problem, and we will continue to do that. It can involve lots of different elements. 

QUESTION: There is a criticism coming on the Turkomen dimension of the Iraq issue, especially among Turkish decision-makers and policy-makers, as well as in public opinion. The criticism is based on the contention that the U.S. is not treating the Turkomen in Kirkuk fairly, and not considering the sensitive ethnic structure. The criticism is that the U.S. is basically sitting and watching the change of the demographic structure of Kirkuk by the Kurdish population. How do you see that situation? Do you agree with this assessment? Or can you tell us that the U.S. is considering the ethnic sensitivity of the Turkomen?

Ambassador Edelman: This is an issue we have also discussed frequently with Turkish colleagues. I think we also agree that the rights of the Tukomen population in Iraq ought to be protected, just as the rights of all Iraqi citizens -- whether they are Kurds or Turkomen or Assyrian, or whether they are Sunni or Shia -- ought to be protected. In the absence of an elected, legitimate Iraqi government, we perforce have to come up with mechanisms -- as we have with the IGC and the interim Cabinet of Ministers -- which in some way reflect the ethnic and sectarian diversity of the population in Iraq. One can argue whether there should be two seats or three seats or four seats, or this ministry or that ministry, but I'm not sure how productive that kind of discussion would be. It seems to me that the strategic principle that we ought to be focusing on is one that I think we share in common: we want the outcome to be a politically unified Iraqi state with its territorial integrity intact. I think in that regard we need to bend all of our efforts to getting Iraqis to think of themselves as Iraqis, and as part of one unified Iraqi State, rather than as Assyrians or as Shia or as Sunni. We need to move towards a system in which everybody's rights are protected under rule of law as individuals, and in which there is not any discrimination for or against ethnic or sectarian groups. I have seen reports about efforts to change the ethnic balance in Kirkuk. I can't pretend to be an expert on that, and we are looking into those reports. I have seen them in the Turkish press, but I'm just not in a position to comment. I just don't know what the facts on the ground are.

QUESTION: We see a statement from Colonel Mayville in that region that he was actually asking Arabs who are now living in Kirkuk to go back to their original locations. Actually, this statement implies a kind of ethnic cleansing. Would you like to comment on that?

Ambassador Edelman: I haven't seen the statement attributed to Colonel Mayville and, as I said, we are looking into the question about what may or may not be happening in Kirkuk with regard to the demographic balance. I haven't seen it. I have to look at it.

I think I need to get on to some other things that I have to do, but maybe I can take one or two more questions.

QUESTION: Are you concerned about the tensions between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds? After all, they are a basic element in Iraq.

Ambassador Edelman: I would say my concern is for the overall Turkish-Iraqi relationship. I think the Turkish Government has been quite wise to begin -- since last summer -- to try to articulate a policy that is looking at all of Iraq. I know there have been some statements made by a variety of people that have created a certain amount of difficulty and tension over the last several months. I was personally encouraged by what I believe to have been a very successful visit by Celal Talabani, when he was here in his capacity as the temporary president for the month of November of the Iraqi Governing Council. But there is going to be, inevitably, lots of tugging and hauling inside Iraq as Iraqis try to sort out their political future. I'm sure there will be more statements in the future that will create difficulties. In our relationship, that just has to be managed by both sides in a way that produces the best possible Turkish-Iraqi relationship at the end of all this. I am cautiously optimistic that things will get better over time.

I would say one other thing, which is an issue for the Turkish press to consider as well. There is, in the modern world with the internet and with satellite television, a plethora of information that comes out everywhere in the world, but particularly in a situation like Iraq. It is something my wife sometimes calls "too much information." The point is that there are lots of reports that come out, but I think it is incumbent on people, just as a matter of professionalism, to check the sources of this information. I hope people would weigh the sources of the information, particularly before they publish. Because, sometimes, publishing things that are either attributed to people or reports about events that may or may not have happened can have real consequences in the real world.

I will offer one recent example which struck me quite forcefully. A couple of weeks ago, a relatively conservative press outlet here ran a story about U.S. forces raping women in Iraq. The alleged authority that was quoted was, I believe, an American. It might have been Canadian. I was a little surprised, because I had never heard of this person before. But it didn't take me too long working on the internet myself -- doing a little research -- to discover that this person was a sex therapist running a series of pornographic websites. It seemed like an odd source for the particular journal that published it. But publishing these things can have real consequences in the real world. I noticed the other day in "Milliyet" that there was a story interviewing the family of one of the suicide bombers in Istanbul. One of those family members was quoted as, in essence, justifying the suicide bomber's action because of "all of the women who have been raped in Iraq by U.S. forces." So there are going to be all sorts of tensions in Iraq. There are going to be all sorts of problems and troubles. I just think that it is incumbent on all of us -- both those in the press and those in government who have to deal with these issues -- to try as much as we possibly can to do it on the basis of confirmed facts rather than rumors or innuendo or unsubstantiated reports. And my colleagues at the Embassy -- if there is a question that any of you have -- please ask us and we will try to help run down the information for you, or provide a steer on whether a source appears credible or not to us based on what we know.

QUESTION: About the allegations on the whereabouts of the Uzan family: there are reports that some of the family members are living in the U.S., and that files have been given to the Embassy here and also in Washington. Do you have anything to say about that?

Ambassador Edelman: The only thing I can say is that I have not seen anything that would confirm the presence of any members of the Uzan family in the United States. We have received from the Ministry of Justice a request for extradition of the two members who you refer to. I immediately signed it and have passed it on to Washington. But because this is an ongoing law enforcement investigation, I am really not in a position to comment any further on it. You have all been very patient with me while I've gone on at great length, so I'm grateful to you. But Murat, you had one last question, so if you want to close it out I'll stop on that one.

QUESTION: On the upcoming elections in Cyprus, U.S. Representative Tom Weston has said that if the opposition wins the situation will change. But the fact of the matter is that regardless of the election results, Denktas is going to be the negotiator. So is the U.S. going to do some fine-tuning in its Cyprus policy based on changing circumstances?

Ambassador Edelman: We are going to have an opportunity to let the voters in northern Cyprus speak their piece in the next couple of days. Given the variety of poll data I have seen, and the conflicting poll data I have seen, I think it would be the height of foolishness to try to predict the outcome. We have all been gratified by the statements of the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Gul that Turkey supports a free and fair election in northern Cyprus. I think it would be incumbent on everybody after the election to work as hard as they can in the very limited time that will be available to try to reach a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus. I am sure that will require fine-tuning on everyone's part.

QUESTION: You underlined the importance of the Turkish statement about the need for fair elections in northern Cyprus. I understand that this means the U.S. attaches great importance to a fair and open election. However, when we see the statements from Tom Weston and Verheugen from the European Commission, they take sides. They openly take sides with the opposition. Don't you see a conflict there?

Ambassador Edelman: I'm not quite sure what Mr. Verheugen actually said. I saw that there were remarks attributed to him, and saw that there was some controversy about whether that is, in fact, what he did say. It goes back to the question -- on issues where it's very easy to inflame people's emotions -- I think it is incumbent on all of us to be very careful about what we say and what we quote. So I'm really not sure what Verhaugen said. If Verheugen said what he is alleged to have said, that would be one thing. But I just don't know what actually happened there. I would say that I believe that if you review Tom Weston's statements, he has been pretty careful to say that we support an outcome that would support the Annan Plan. That shouldn't come as a surprise to anybody, because the United States has said for a very long time that we believe the Annan Plan must be the basis for negotiations and a settlement. I think some people have interpreted that as Tom Weston taking sides in the election. But I think we have publicly and privately been at great pains with all concerned to say that we think it is important to have a free and fair election so that we have an opportunity to move forward quickly, whatever the outcome, and to get to work on a settlement.

Thank you all very much for your patience and your time, and I hope we can do this from time to time. I hope it has been a useful discussion. Thanks. 

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