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Deputy Assistant Secretary Matt Bryza Interview with Prof. Soli Ozel

Four Seasons Hotel, Istanbul  
February 8, 2007

 

OZEL: Thank you for speaking with me. Maybe our readers ought to know who you are first. You are obviously a household name by now. But exactly what do you do, why are you in Turkey?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: I am here in my capacity as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, responsible for U.S. relations with Turkey and Greece and Cyprus, and the South Caucasus. Also, I’m responsible for coordinating and developing a policy on energy security in Europe, building on all that we did together at Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan. And another responsibility I have is to try to develop policies with our European allies on integration of European Muslim populations into democratic societies in Europe. And the last thing, I’m the mediator for a series of conflicts. For Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Cyprus. Any of those things are relevant for Turkey.  All of them.

 

OZEL: Well, obviously this is a very large folder that you’re holding. Let me start with a very general question; then I’ll get to your areas of responsibility. Foreign Minister Gul was in Washington. The Chief of the General Staff is going to be in Washington next week. You’re here. And obviously there are some tensions and also there are some sparks of good news in Turkish-American relations – whither Turkish-American relations?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Whither. Well, we will soon see, depending upon how effectively, together, we manage this issue coming up of the Armenian Genocide Resolution, and how effectively we achieve our obligation of eliminating the PKK terrorist threat, be that in Iraq or in Europe. I think we’ve heard even today some good news even from Foreign Minister Gul, where he recognized our very active cooperation with some European allies, resulting in some arrests, in France. I’m not taking credit for that, I mean France did that.  But we have had a very active effort over the course of the last year to encourage our European allies to take this problem very seriously. So if we keep that up, I think the whither in Turkish-American relations is very good.

 

OZEL: I’m glad you said that. Well, obviously, the Turkish public would wonder, without necessarily showing gratitude, why so late, since the PKK has been there forever? Secondly, as you said, that the obligation to take on the PKK has been articulated by yourself, among others, but by many people in positions of responsibility. And at least, nothing has taken place to the satisfaction of the Turkish public. What’s different now?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Well, number one, we have to ask ourselves, what’s going to satisfy the Turkish public. I would hope what we have achieved in Europe, which is real and tangible, will begin to change people’s opinions. You’re right, that we have, at much higher levels than mine, articulated this obligation. President Bush himself has said it repeatedly, and he means it.  I think what has changed for a number of reasons, maybe just the passage of time, maybe the evolution of the situation in Iraq, whatever the reason, we are at a point now – maybe it’s the appointment of General Ralston and giving him some time to act – we have brought together the pieces of our government and now the Iraqi government, in a way that gets us ready for some concrete action. I can’t get into much more detail--

 

OZEL: --I understand, but when you talk about the Iraqi government, for many years outside the Administration, it’s like an oxymoron: Iraqi and government. How much authority do they have, how much can you rely on them, why should anybody believe their word?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Very valid question, Soli, and the first two questions…The answer is, it remains to be seen how much authority they have and how effective they will be. And that is the crux of the problem. We have not been able to devote the U.S. military or coalition forces to the problem in the North because of the obvious difficulties that we are facing throughout Iraq, number one. Number two, we haven’t thought it would be wise simply to try to resolve the problem militarily alone, because number one, there’s no purely military solution. Number two, if we do these things ourselves, the Iraqi government is never seen as being fully sovereign. If it’s not fully sovereign, it’s harder to sustain and maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq.  Number three, we again, simply, I don’t quite know why, maybe I have been a failure or my colleagues have been a failure in bringing together all the pieces of our government, to stop what they’re doing in Iraq, breathe deeply, and say, OK, this is our opportunity to compel the Iraqis to work with us to take these measures.

 

OZEL: OK, you say that you were engaged otherwise, and we’ve heard this, and that you’ve had good relations with the Kurds – a word that you haven’t mentioned so far — and we didn’t really want to jeopardize our relations with them, so we couldn’t really act.

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: I didn’t say that.

 

OZEL: No, you didn’t say that. That is the general message.

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: OK

 

OZEL: That is one: You are otherwise engaged, you don’t have enough troops to engage, and then second, the Kurdish authorities in Northern Iraq, the Kurdistan region, you don’t want to jeopardize your relations with them in any way, and maybe a military action would have that effect. Then you went into Erbil, and took over the Iranian Consular office and arrested about six Iranians. And to the best of our knowledge, from what we read, the Kurds were unhappy about that as well. So you didn’t really mind making them unhappy when you went to attack the Iranians, whoever these guys may be. But you haven’t done so far anything against the PKK which is extraordinarily important [inaudible] this country. Secondly, the Iraqi flag, to the best of our knowledge, is not seen, is not visible, in the North of Iraq, so are we talking about the Iraqi government or are we talking about the Kurdistan regional government? Who’s responsible, and whose cooperation is essential?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: On the first question, I disagree with the pretext. We have failed to take action, not because we’re worried about upsetting the Kurds, that’s not the issue at all. We have been incapable of doing something decisive because of the military challenge of basically going after Kandil mountain. That’s one issue. The amount of forces that it would require to clean out that redoubt is large.  Had it been easier to do, then Turkey would have done it throughout this period, right? You’ve got the most capable military in Europe. The best troops there are, the toughest fighters, so well-equipped, and it wasn’t possible to do in the 90’s, and it’s still really quite a difficult task. That’s one argument. Second point is that the Iranians that we went after are not a broad-based terrorist organization with tentacles all over. This was a concentrated effort against people that that we thought were operatives preparing negative actions. What we were worried about then was action that would de-stabilize all of Northern Iraq, and it doesn’t matter what the population is, Kurdish, Turkmen, Assyrian…whatever it is, that region, which was quiet, could come under serious pressure and de-stabilize. We’re all worried about Kirkuk. You’re worried, we’re worried. That same tension in Kirkuk is the same tension we’ve worried about throughout all of northern Iraq. That had been our mindset. Now that’s changing.  I know we’ve got to get to Kirkuk. You asked me something else too.

 

OZEL: The Iraqi Flag.  So who’s responsible really?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Well, it’s the government of Iraq in Baghdad.  But they alone, based on the reality of the situation, can’t do the whole job. The Kurdish Regional Government has to be involved. They are the ones who, de-facto, have much of the control of the North. But when we talk about working with the Kurdish Regional Government, we mean it and we say it only in the context of the overall umbrella of the government of Iraq.

 

OZEL: You also said that it cannot just be a military solution. What do you mean by that?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: I mean that the phenomenon of PKK terrorism, can be fixed in part by, yes, military action perhaps against Kandil mountain, but there need to be arrests of individuals. An arrest is not a military action, it’s a police action. That needs to happen. Political front offices need to close down. All of the support mechanisms of PKK in Europe, we need to undercut those. We need to close the Makhmur refugee camp, and we’re doing that now.  If we close the camp, though, there needs to be some way to attract the non-terrorist PKK-affiliated people somewhere. Do we just reintegrate them into Iraqi society, or do those who are Turkish citizens go back to Turkey? I don’t know what the answer is, but these problems have to be worked out.

 

OZEL: Is the reason for the progress that we see over the last few months, especially in recent weeks, a function of the Ralston-Baser cooperation? The reason why I’m asking this is because the Turkish public had some doubts about how serious this was, whether or not this was a measure on the part of the United States to buy time, to play for time.

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: You mean the Ralston appointment?

 

OZEL: The Ralston appointment, yes. And General Baser, just last week or so said, just wait because if I didn’t believe we were going to get some results, I wouldn’t be staying in this position.

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Oh, he said that.

 

OZEL: And then I think in about a week, you had the arrests in Europe.

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Someone recently said, if you’re a little patient, you’ll see some results. I remember someone said that recently, yes. Of course this is part of the same process. The President appointed General Ralston, not to buy time. The President appointed General Ralston to produce results. The respect that he commands in the Pentagon is like nothing I’ve seen before. He’s able to open doors and break through obstacles, as a very effective bureaucratic operator.  That’s why we wanted him in there.

 

OZEL: Does that also mean that the bad blood that exists between the Pentagon and the Turkish armed forces because of March 1st and because of the Suleymaniye incident, which still simmers here, is that over, is that episode over, is there no more bad blood left?  No more ill-feeling?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: On an official level that is over and long finished. I obviously can’t speak for every military officer or non-commissioned officer in the U.S. and Turkish militaries, I mean human beings have their own feelings. As an institution, that is absolutely finished, and long over, by the way, from our perspective.

 

OZEL: Let’s finish with Iraq, and let’s get to Kirkuk. You yourself, if I remember correctly, I think it was reported even in our paper. On the 2nd of February, you said that you did not look favorably upon the holding of a referendum this year. Is that correct or not? Let me be sure about what I’m saying.

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: My opinion doesn’t matter at all on this. What I said was that it’s not a forgone conclusion that the referendum will be held this year. I realize that there’s something in the constitution, but the realities are what they are.

 

OZEL: Some of your colleagues, though, speak in a way, which may not be saying decisively that they want the referendum to take place, but which leads one, when one hears it here anyway, that they basically favor a referendum, because it is stipulated in the constitution, and obviously, not just the Turks here, but it seems the Arabs and Turkomen in Kirkuk itself are not terribly happy with that idea, given the fact that there is a lot of fait-accompli on the ground with the Kurds, in terms of population transfers. So how does one get over this impasse? Who’s to judge what the will of the people is?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY: That is a powerful question, one to which I don’t have an answer. If I did, hopefully, I would be sitting in a higher chair than the one I currently occupy.

 

OZEL: We hope that you will, anyway.

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Thank you, Soli. What is clear is that, Turks, Arabs, Americans, even to a certain extent Kurds, have a shared interest in Kirkuk not blowing up. And I have always thought, since before the war began, but since the first time we ever thought about the Kirkuk question, that the U.S. and Turkey, and the Iraqi Arabs are pulling in the same direction. Nobody wants displacement of population, nobody wants the property difficulties, everybody wants a just restitution, and ethnic cleansing is a terrible thing. I’m not saying ethnic cleansing is happening, but there’s so much tension that that is the way the situation could devolve. So we have a shared interest. The Americans don’t need to be convinced by Turkey that this is a problem. We know it. So, because of that, I have some hope or some anticipation that perhaps the referendum will be held later. The constitution says it has to be held this year. It’s important to honor the constitution, but the political realities are so intense and so serious that things could change. I have no authority to say anything, really, because I don’t handle the Iraq policy in a direct way. I’m just offering my own observation in this case.

 

OZEL: Does the U.S. Military on the ground have a say over this or an opinion about this? What would General Petraeus say?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA:  You should ask him. I don’t know what the General would say.

 

OZEL: OK. Today I believe, 50,000 US and Iraqi troops are added in trying to clean Baghdad.

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY: Is it 50,000?

 

OZEL: That’s what I heard. I’m not quite sure of that so I’ll strike that out. The President’s plan has been announced and obviously the Congress, despite a lot of brouhaha is not going to block it.  Not you personally, but within the Administration, what is the mood? Is that seen as something that’s going to break the dead-end that the U.S. seems to find itself in? Will you be able to secure Baghdad and will that be enough?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY:  Well, that’s certainly the hope. I mean, it’s the President’s plan, we’re obviously all behind it. And the hope is that you don’t need a huge influx of soldiers to do this job, to secure Baghdad.

 

OZEL: What’s Plan B? If it doesn’t succeed, because there’s been other plans and they haven’t succeeded.

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY:  Well there was a time when people said, in fact when a very esteemed official in this country said, that the US had no Plan B. We did have a plan B.

 

OZEL: Well that was 4 years ago and it was the days of the cake walk. And so, I mean… let bygones be bygones on that particular one. What is the level of cooperation of the United States and Turkey, vis a vis Iraq? What are the issues and problems on which you do cooperate? Because my understanding is that the Europe operation was perhaps an outcome of the cooperation between the intelligence services of both countries. Whether you can confirm that or not, I don’t know.

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: OK. The operation in Europe was as a result of broad based cooperation. I am proud to say that it was led by the U.S. Department of State. In fact, I’m very proud of what we were able to do together. But of course, law enforcement people, and intelligence people and military people were all involved in the effort. It was a rare example of the entire inter-agency community coming together, and Treasury, people who track financial flows. And then we went to Europe with this team, and sat down with our counterpart people in key capitals and said, here is the problem. Here are the people. You say you can’t find them, well why don’t you look over there, try over there? You can’t arrest them because you can’t convict them of terrorism? Well, what about financial crimes, what about other crimes, have you tried that?  And it worked. So this was a broad based, integrated effort.

 

OZEL: How concerned are you about the fact that Turkey is the country where anti-Americanism tops every other country?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: As an individual?

 

OZEL: Or as an official, whichever you prefer

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY: I’ll answer both ways. As an individual it’s deeply painful. I love this country. But also as an individual, loving it and having spent some time here, I hope I’m allowed some degree of optimism, maybe naiveté – I think it’s not naïve though -- to believe that anti-Americanism is shallow. It’s based on some current perceptions, misperceptions of what has been happening. I think there are some deep misperceptions about what happened in Suleymaniye on July 4th 2003 –

 

OZEL: May I interrupt you, one of your former colleagues, Henri Barkey, said last Monday, that the Suleymaniye incident occurred because the Turkish Special Forces there, without the authorization of the General Staff, were about to assassinate the Governor, or the Vice Governor of Kirkuk.

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA:      Henri said that?

 

OZEL: Henri said that, yes, it’s on paper. And, is that so?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Henri’s a very smart man. I don’t know if people had authority or not, but there was a reason for that response on our side. And one could argue that perhaps it was more severe than allies would like to treat each other, but those ---

 

OZEL: He said that too. That the U.S. did not need to treat those soldiers like Al Qaeda.

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Once again, Henri’s a very smart man. But the severity of our response was for a reason. I mean, why would we ever want to alienate our most important ally in Iraq, or one of our most important allies anywhere in the world? There was real just cause for what they did.

 

OZEL: OK. Now, if I come back to our most important ally, because many Turks are wondering if the Kurds have replaced Turkey as the most important ally. On the other hand, just yesterday the Baku – Tbilisi – Kars railroad was started. This will bypass Armenia, so that will take us to the Armenian issue as well. Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan was a project that the Americans pushed very hard for and obviously this was for strategic reasons, and all those are indications that yes, Turkey is an important ally for energy security, for the future, the Black Sea Region, the Caucuses, what have you. Why do you think the Turks doubt this?  Is there a question of communication…on whose part?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY: Every relationship that enters problems, derives those problems from both sides. So certainly, there’s been miscommunication on our side, absolutely. There’s been plenty of miscommunication. But there’s also something about being Turkish, I guess, that always leads you to be worried, and doubting yourself and doubting your friends. What’s the first line of your national anthem? Don’t be afraid, right? There’s a danger everywhere, all the time. Life can’t be so good, and if you think it’s good, you must be naive, right? So I think that’s a big part of it. For me, sitting in Washington, to have anyone suggest that the Kurds could a) be an ally in the sense of a sovereign state and b) replace Turkey, it must be a conspiracy to anger us, because it’s so absurd. Nobody can replace Turkey as an ally.  Nobody can.  Turkey’s irreplaceable.

 

OZEL: So your indirect message is that the U.S. government, at least in your person, does not condone an independent Kurdistan. Meaning you don’t condone the breakup of Iraq?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY: Of course not. Our President made that clear in the speech he gave on Iraq.  He said territorial integrity.  He means it.  He’s the boss.  So I mean it.

 

OZEL: We read in the paper that Foreign Minister Gul met with Vice President Cheney. Some maps were opened. I haven’t yet read a full account of that meeting.  Do you know?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: No, I didn’t hear anything about maps.

 

OZEL: First the Vice President said that the Administration would do everything it could in order to block the passing of the resolution on the Armenian genocide. But that he then also opened maps and you had the pipelines, oil pipelines, gas pipelines, and what have you. But we don’t know exactly what it was that they discussed, or what Vice President Cheney related to Gul.

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY: I must say, I had shared some of my favorite maps that I asked our experts to commission with the Vice President’s office, on pipelines, yeah.

 

OZEL: Are pipelines very exciting?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY: They are very exciting, yes. Soli, there is an opportunity now that we’re going to seize together, for Turkey to elevate its strategic importance even higher, on energy. It was Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan that really stimulated a sense of strategic partnership in our countries back in the 90’s. We focused on completing Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and the South Caucasus gas pipeline. That’s done. And now we’ve decided, as a country, that we want to work with Turkey, with Georgia, and especially with Azerbaijan, to expand the gas element of that network of pipelines in a very substantial way, so that Azerbaijan will be able to provide an alternative to essentially the single, predominant supplier to Europe of gas right now.  We are not anti-Russia, not anti-Gazprom. We’re happy that Gazprom can provide gas to northern Europe and Turkey, otherwise you’d be cold and dark in winter.

 

OZEL:  There’s no more winter, anyway.

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: That’s the good news (laughter).  We think that Turkish consumers and all European consumers should have the same variety, or some variety of suppliers of their most important commodity, just as they have variety of suppliers of any other commodity.

 

OZEL: How closely do you work with Turkey on making sure that Georgia remains independent?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA:  Closely.  We have a long and successful history over the last decade of military to military cooperation involving Georgia.  We do close consultations on defense reform with Georgia.  I personally stay in very close contact with my Turkish colleagues when talking about Abkhazia.  We are so pleased that Batumi airport is now opening up as a regional airport for both Turkey and Georgia.  And Turkey is a very important partner, as we try to fix the problems. 

 

OZEL:  OK, obviously the missing piece is Armenia.  Armenia is bypassed, either for pipelines or for the railroad. The Turkish –Armenian border is closed.  One would assume the United States would like to have three allies instead of two, in the Southern Caucasus. And then, of course, you have the Armenian Resolution in the U.S. Congress.  And obviously, one of the reasons, if not the most important reason for the Turkish- Armenian border being closed is the fact that not only Nagorno-Karabakh, but also twenty percent of Azerbaijan proper is under occupation.  And the Minsk group or any other initiative didn’t really work.  And let’s start with a strategic thing.  Is there anything that the United States can do, will do, is trying to do to put the last piece of the puzzle together for its own strategic purposes and what are the (inaudible) ?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Yes, I am proud to tell you that I am the negotiator for Nagorno-Karabakh, I am the Minsk Group Co-chair U.S. representative.  And we are making progress, and these aren’t empty, sugar-coated words. Well, we and the parties, are closer to a settlement of  Nagorno-Karabakh than they have ever been.  Certainly closer than in the summer time, in June, when there was a meeting with great fanfare in Bucharest.  And I would argue probably closer to a resolution than back in Key West.  We’ve rethought the proposal that had been on the table in Key West, we restructured that, and thought it through in a rational way.  What does each side need to get to ‘yes’? And what sort of political dynamic must we generate to get there?  I know I am talking abstractly here, but it worked.  And we presented those proposals last June in Vienna, on the 22nd of June.  At that time it seemed the sides were tired of the negotiating process and they were simply rejecting the proposals.  We said ‘ok, we are going to take a pause, until you come back and offer your own suggestions on how to improve on what we have put on the table.’  That has happened.  And this autumn the foreign ministers met repeatedly, the presidents met in Minsk, and they have narrowed their differences considerably.  Whether or not they have narrowed the differences enough to reach an agreement in the next couple of months…I know that is not true.  There won’t be an agreement before Armenian elections in May.  But there could be later on, in spring or later.  And as we get closer, we will bring to bear whatever superior power well above me that is necessary to try to close a deal. 

 

OZEL:  Does this in any way relate to the Armenian resolution?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA:  Our efforts do not relate to the Armenian resolution because we realize that it is in all of our shared Euro-Atlantic strategic interest to resolve Karabakh.

 

OZEL: When I talk to people here, elsewhere, obviously March-April-May, we have elections upcoming, that is not a question I would raise with you, but two things: If the PKK resumes terrorist activities and the perception of this in the public is that the U.S. hasn’t done enough or hasn’t done anything, whichever, and add to this the passing of the Armenian resolution, it would be almost impossible to contain the Turkish public’s fury.  There is no government, or no bureaucracy can actually manage to tame or to quell the fury.  And that Turkish-American relations would be hurt in ways that maybe even March 1st or Suleymaniye didn’t do.  Where are we?  We know the Administration works hard, but does the Administration have the power to prevail over Congress?  Or does Congress understand what is at stake?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: We don’t know.  But you asked the question precisely how I would like to answer.  It is exactly the right question to ask.  I look at this effort, we’re in the middle of …like a sporting event, we know we will run as fast as we can, jump as high as we can, make every effort. I don’t know if we are going to win.  And is that going to be enough?  I don’t know.  Can we prevail upon Congress?  No. It is an independent separate branch of government.  Obviously, the political mechanisms have changed dramatically since November of last year; it is no longer possible to simply have the Vice President call the speaker of the House, who is from the same party and see eye to eye on this issue.  So what we have to do is what you said, we need to convince Congress that the cost of this vote, as justified as it may be in many peoples’ eyes in the Congress, has a very significant price.  I mean, it is very high, the cost is very high.  The cost is high in terms of the cooperation we enjoy with Turkey and Iraq.  You asked me about that, we didn’t really get to that, but it is extensive.  And the cost is high.  I think most profoundly and most significantly in a moral, internal, philosophical, psychological sense, in Turkey.  I have been involved, on April 24th, the President’s statement, we’re very involved in that, and our objective every year was of course to do honor to the victims, but also to try to elicit a deeper debate here in Turkey, a more candid look internally at this horrible set of events.  So that our Turkish friends simply reconcile themselves with their past and with their Armenian neighbors, their former brothers and sisters.  That is the goal.  If a political decision is made on how to characterize these events in a way that is so objectionable and deemed as so unjust by Turks, what we will do is close minds rather than open them.  We need to open minds and I feel we have begun to sense some of that mind-opening, particularly after the tragic murder of Hrant Dink.  It would be terrible to undermine that process, because ultimately the way we best honor the victims is by, well, the changing of the mindset here.

 

OZEL:  Is there any message of saying the opening of the border is quid pro quo?  Would the Congress demand this?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY:  I don’t know. I don’t know what Congress would demand.  And I don’t think that Congress knows.  There is going to be an intense discussion within Congress, so there is not a game plan, there is not a worked-out strategy.  I think like any sensitive issue, there will be a rigorous debate in the Congress.  But what is true, I think, is that Turkey can really help us help it, if it makes a dramatic gesture, it could be abolishing article 301, it could be…

 

OZEL: I understand that 301 is understood at least in the United States, even by you, as being specifically about the Armenian issue. 

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY: No, it is about insulting Turkishness which could be many, many different things. But it is such a charged issue.

 

OZEL: What else?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA:  Could be opening the border, all of these steps - that is a reversible step by the way - but opening the border, it could be some statement of just simply historical recognition of pain and suffering, without any mention of any specific characterization or guilt or innocence.  Just, “Oh my gosh this was terrible!”

 

OZEL: I did indeed cut you off, and if you want to add something:  What we do together in Iraq.

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: What we do together in Iraq.  Number one, diplomatically and operationally we have very strong coordination now.  Your embassy, our embassy, on the ground, Celikkol did a great job, does a great job as the Foreign Ministry Coordinator on Iraq Policy.  We talk to each other a lot, and think things through together.  That is very important.  But logistically, Turkey is so helpful. We all look at March 1st.  Well, after that, what happened? Not only did Turkey offer troops in October of 2003, but it has offered these over-flights which are of such great value to us at Incirlik.  Seventy-five per cent of all the air cargo that goes into Iraq to support the coalition transits Incirlik airbase.  We are deeply grateful for that.  And also through Habur gate.  A quarter of the fuel that supports coalition troops, or a quarter of the fuel that supports the Iraqi population, 19 per cent of the food and water that the Iraqi civilians consume, that all goes through Habur gate. 

 

OZEL:  And your troop movements…

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA:  That, I don’t know about.  Our troop movements usually happen in different places. 

 

OZEL: But that is precisely on that issue of Incirlik.  Are you concerned at all that should the Armenian resolution pass and there is really an insurmountable pressure by the Turkish public, that Turkey would react the way it did in 1975, and stop operations in Incirlik?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: I don’t want to predict how the sovereign Government of Turkey will respond.  But we know the history.

 

OZEL: I guess our time is running out.  Just one final question on the most important issue that you and I discussed in 30 seconds at Brussels airport: Cyprus.  The mood in this country is that the EU has really behaved with ill will on this issue of Cyprus.  Many people, even the most Europhile ones, are a bit turned off by this lack of, if you will, commitment to a promise that was made.  Rightly or wrongly, that is the mood.  On Cyprus in particular, the Turkish public does not believe that the EU behaved fairly or intelligently, and certainly there is no mood in pushing anyone to make any other moves whatsoever.  Is there any way, and I think we’re at an impasse and the Greek Cypriots are members of the European Union, without (inaudible) and obviously there are advantages of being in.  Is there anything the United States either can do or contemplates doing to break the impasse?  I mean can you at least manage to start in earnest, UN mediated negotiations?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: I hope we can, that is our goal, the way forward is to convince both Talat and Papadopoulos to sit down and then officially launch.

 

OZEL: If you were Papadopoulos, why would you sit down?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA: Because I care about the future of my island, which I want to be unified. 

 

OZEL: I don’t doubt that he cares about the future of the island, I am just not sure that he cares about the future of the island with two populations that have equal rights.  Don’t ask for citizenship rights and he’ll be perfectly happy to sit down.  So far, that has been his record anyway.  So how do you…?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY:  Perhaps that has been his record, but is that what he really wants inside?  At some point, it becomes clear the world is better for the citizens of the Republic of Cyprus if the tension is reduced.  If I am--

 

OZEL: There is no tension, three people died in over 30 years.

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA:  I mean just political tension.  If you are a Greek Cypriot, and if you live south of the Green Line, well you think about the presence of Turkish troops, isn’t life better for you if there are a few or no Turkish troops?  Isn’t life better if the whole island is prospering even more, because there is trade on both sides?  That has got to be better.  Isn’t it better?

 

OZEL: That is what the Annan plan promised.  And obviously, that wasn’t good enough.  And in the meantime, by the way, in the last three years we have Turkish Cypriots moving from 65 percent accepting the Annan plan based on the unified island, to 65 percent basically wanting a two-state solution. 

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA:  That perhaps is why there is an incentive for the other side, for the Greek Cypriot side, to want to move toward a resolution.  I will never believe that Papadopoulos wants a two-state solution.  I don’t believe that.  How much authority he is willing to give up to the Turkish Cypriot community is a question that remains to be worked out.  No leader in any country likes to give up authority.  Nobody likes to do that.  But that has to happen if there is going to be a settlement.  So what we are arguing about or have been arguing about is how the authority is divided between the two sides.  The Annan plan didn’t make it. 

 

OZEL: Or is it dead? What will be the basis of a new agreement?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA:  I don’t think it could possibly be dead, because the Annan plan isn’t a being that lives and breathes; it is a process that is going on for several years, that has led to some significant areas of agreement.  And it is necessary to build on that agreement and draw from the Annan plan that both sides want to move forward. And when there is no agreement, come up with another way forward.  That is precisely what (inaudible) brokered agreement of last July 8 does.  It asked the sides to prioritize what issues they want to work on, both day-to-day issues and so-called substantive issues.  So the next step is to implement the Gambari agreement. 

 

OZEL:  Were you concerned at all about what transpired last week? You know the Greek Cypriots signed agreements with Egypt and Lebanon, and then the Turkish vessels began to move… Is this the kind of risks that we ought to try to avoid and maybe be more sensible?  Do you think the Greek Cypriots will see it that way, or will they see it as another instance of aggression?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA:  I can’t really judge very actively or accurately what was going on in the Greek Cypriot decision making process at the time.  What I can say is any step, any measurement that increases tension, increases emotionality, moves us further away from re-starting a process.  The Gambari agreement is aimed at decreasing the emotionality by focusing on concrete issues and not worrying about whether or not the Annan plan is on the table.

 

OZEL:  The other people are not as optimistic about the Gambari agreement as you are.  I mean people may differ in their views.  Finally, can Kosovo set a precedent for the Cyprus issue? Why not?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA:  No.  Because every conflict is unique.  Kosovo has factors that are unmatched anywhere in the world.  A specific set of circumstances, a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing launched by Slobodan Milosevic, led to an intervention by NATO, and supervision by the United Nations.  That has never happened anywhere else in the world.  Each conflict is unique anyway.  We categorically reject any notion of universal precedent for any other conflict.  Each conflict is so intricate, each set of issues is so distinct that there is no sense in talking about a precedent.   I mean, is Chechnya a precedent?

 

OZEL:  You have been very forthcoming, thank you very much.  And I wonder if you have anything that you want to add, that I forgot to ask, or not pushed you hard enough on?

 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRYZA:  You asked everything.  It was great.  Thanks, Soli Bey.  Great to be with you.

 

OZEL: Ok, thank you very much.  My pleasure.

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